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O P I N I O N*   
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Alton Coles (“Coles”) appeals the District Court’s sentencing order.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the facts 
necessary to the disposition of this appeal.  Coles was convicted of various crimes and 
sentenced to life imprisonment, plus multiple concurrent sentences, plus consecutive 
sentences totaling 55 years.  In January 2014, this Court “affirm[ed] the judgments on all 
contested counts” for Coles and his two codefendants.  United States v. Coles (Coles I), 
558 F. App’x 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2014).  However, the Court included a footnote 
explaining that, “[i]n accordance with United States v. Diaz [(Diaz I)], 592 F.3d 467 (3d 
Cir. 2010), and without opposition, we will vacate Coles’s conviction on two counts.”  
Coles I, 558 F. App’x at 176 n.1.  Diaz I held that the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits multiple 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions that are based on the same 
predicate offense, Diaz I, 592 F.3d at 475, and the parties agreed that this was the 
situation for Coles: counts 70 and 72 were based on the same predicate offense as count 
68.  Therefore, the Court “remand[ed] Coles’s case to the District Court for the entry of 
an amended judgment in accordance with this opinion.”  Coles I, 558 F. App’x at 189. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Approximately two months passed between the time this Court remanded the case 
and the time the District Court entered its amended judgment.  During the interim, Coles 
filed a lengthy motion to expand the record, arguing the District Court should resentence 
Coles because of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).1  In that motion, Coles 
did not present—or even allude to—any evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation.2  
Thereafter, the District Court entered an amended judgment, which reinstated the 
life sentence and multiple concurrent sentences, but vacated counts 70 and 72 and the 
corresponding consecutive sentences totaling 55 years and instead imposed a 5-year 
consecutive sentence on the remaining § 924(c) count.  After the entry of the amended 
judgment, Coles did not move for reconsideration based on his supposed postsentencing 
rehabilitation, nor did he otherwise present such evidence to the District Court.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
On appeal, Coles raises only a single issue: whether the District Court should have 
held a hearing in which Coles could have presented evidence of postsentencing 
rehabilitation before entry of the amended judgment.  This Court has a “deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing sentencing appeals,” United States v. Grimes, 
739 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2014), and exercises plenary review over issues of law, 
Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Coles’ appeal fails because the District Court did not need to consider Coles’ 
unknown evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation.  In Pepper v. United States, the 
                                              
1 This argument is not pressed on appeal. 
2 Although this motion is not included in the appendix, “parts of the record may be relied 
on by the court . . . even though not included in the appendix.”  Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(2). 
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Supreme Court held that “when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, a 
district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing 
rehabilitation.”  131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011).  However, the key word is “may.”  Id.  The 
Court explicitly did not hold that district courts “must” consider such evidence.  Id. at 
1249 n.17.  Specifically, the Court caveated that it did not “mean to preclude courts of 
appeals from issuing limited remand orders, in appropriate cases, that may render 
evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation irrelevant in light of the narrow purposes of the 
remand proceeding.”  Id.  
Conceding that Coles I was a limited remand order, Coles instead argues that we 
should ignore this statement in Pepper as dicta.  This argument is unconvincing.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Diaz (Diaz II), 639 F.3d 616, 623 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Importantly, 
we note, as the Supreme Court did in Pepper, that to the extent that a court remands for a 
limited resentencing proceeding, and not a de novo proceeding, limitations on the 
consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation may continue to be appropriate.”).   
Neither the District Court nor this Court knows what evidence Coles would use to 
demonstrate his postsentencing rehabilitation.  After the remand, Coles filed a motion 
arguing that the District Court should resentence him for a reason unrelated to the present 
appeal.  Coles could have presented his postsentencing rehabilitation evidence therein.  
He did not.  Likewise, after the entry of the amended judgment, Coles could have moved 
for reconsideration in light of his postsentencing rehabilitation.  He did not.  Accordingly, 
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the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it resentenced Coles without 
considering the postsentencing rehabilitation evidence that Coles never presented.3 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court’s order is affirmed. 
                                              
3 We do not consider new arguments raised in Coles’ Reply Brief.  See United States v. 
Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[B]ecause Cruz raises this argument for the 
first time in the Reply Brief, we will not consider it.  Instead, we will deem it, like the 
other arguments that were raised for the first time in the Reply Brief, to be waived.”). 
